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One day, someone in these pictures will be receiving 
healthcare. Potentially in your hospital or office. 
I don’t want them (or anyone) to get an infection or die
That day is today
Do contact precautions work for  
the control of MDRO’s?
Are some pathogens more important than others? 
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VAP 4,9472 17,677 7,904 12,034 9,969
UTI 3,8031 NS 650 1,361 1,006
SSI 2,7342 15,646 1,783 134,602 25,546
BSI 33,2683 38,703 1,822 107,156 36,441
MRSA NS $35,367 NS NS NS
U.S. MDRO Trends
Fig 2 
American Journal of Infection Control 2012 40, 194-200DOI: (10.1016/j.ajic.2012.02.001) 
≥
MRSA prevalence rate per 1,000 inpatients by state
2010
Jarvis WR, Jarvis AA, Chinn, R.
PA is the 10th 
highest MRSA 
prevalence rate in 
the US
ESBL rates among Enterobacteriaceae isolates collected in 72 U.S. hospitals located in the nine U.S. census regions.
Castanheira M, Farrell SE, Krause KM, et al. 2013. Contemporary diversity of ß-lactamases among Enterobacteriaceae in the 9 
U.S. census regions and ceftazidime-avibactam activity tested against isolates producing the most prevalent ß-lactamase groups. 
Antimicrob Agents Chemother. 2014;58(2):833-838.
Prevalence of extended-spectrum-β-lactamase 
(ESBL) n the 9 U.S. Census Regions
PA is in the highest ESBL  
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Where can we find MDROs?
• Hands of HCWs caring for infected/colonized patients
• Gloves of HCWs caring for infected/colonized patients
• Gowns/coats of HCWs
• Ties of HCWs
• Stethoscopes - 7% of stethoscopes were contaminated with MRSA
• Computer keyboards
• Stuff in the patients room






• Supplies in the room
Everywhere
Pick Your Poison
• Do they ALL Matter
• Should they all be eliminated
• An unfocused approach is what has been 
done for years
– IT DOESN’T WORK
They will try to beat you down…
• Focus, Focus, Focus
– One by one




• Despite traditional and current infection control 
guidelines, strategies to prevent bad outcomes have 
not been widely and successfully implemented.
• Locations that had prevention strategies in place have 
decided that they are too labor intense and are not 
implementing them or disbanding them.
Barriers to accomplishing effective Prevention
– Is it just too hard. Should endemic centers just stop trying?
Consequences of MDROs
Issues
• Frequent – Too Many
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1. Do MDRO Control Measures work?
a. For outbreaks?
b. Even if they have become endemic?
2. Are Contact precautions necessary to 
control these pathogens? 
3. Are patients in contact precautions as 
safe as other patients? 
Extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)
• MDR GNR pose one of the most 
vexing infectious disease challenges  
• β-lactamases hydrolyze the β-lactam 
ring and render antibiotics 
ineffective
• Common antibiotics like penicillins 
and cephalosporins don’t work
• The plasmids carrying the gene 
encoding the ESBLs frequently carries 
other genes encoding resistance to 
aminoglycosides and TMP/S (Bactrim) 
• Typically carbapenems or quinolones 
are used.
– Newer reports with quinolone resistance too.
ESBL Clinical Impact
• Mortality (42%)
– Higher in patients ESBL bacteremia
• Did not receive appropriate antibiotic therapy 
• Duration of hospital stay/hospital charges
– Higher in patients ESBL infections than with non-ESBL-producing 
organisms of the same species. 
– Median length of hospital stay post infection of 29 days vs 11 days in 
those with non-ESBL-producing KP infection.
• Brooklyn Antibiotic Resistance Task Force
Schwaber MJ, et al. Mortality and delay in effective therapy associated with extended-spectrum beta-lactamase production in Enterobacteriaceae
bacteraemia: a systematic review and meta-analysis. J Antimicrob Chemother2007; 60:913–20.
Tumbarello M. et al. Costs of bloodstream infections caused by Escherichia coli and influence of extended-spectrum-β-lactamase production and 
inadequate initial antibiotic therapy. Antimicrob Agents Chemother 2010; 54:4085–91.
Anonymous. 2002. The cost of antibiotic resistance: effect of resistance among Staphylococcus aureus, Klebsiella pneumoniae, Acinetobacter
baumannii, and Pseudmonas aeruginosa on length of hospital stay. Infect. Control Hosp. Epidemiol. 23:106-108
Lautenbach, E., J. B. Patel, W. B. Bilker, P. H. Edelstein, and N. O. Fishman. 2001. Extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing Escherichia 
coliand Klebsiella pneumoniae: risk factors for infection and impact of resistance on outcomes. Clin. Infect. Dis. 32:1162-1171.
ESBL Risk Factors
• Seriously ill patients 
• Prolonged hospital stays 




• Especially if prolonged duration.
• Heavy antibiotic use
Bradford, P. A., et al. Antimicrob. Agents Chemother. 39:899-905. Bird, J., et al. J. Hosp. Infect. 40:243-247. Wiener, J., et al. . JAMA 281:517-523.
ESBL Transmission within health-care
• Acute to nursing home (NH)
• NHs to acute  - Chicago Long-term Care
– 46% of residents were ESBL colonized 
(all E. coli) 
– All had been in the NH, without 
intercurrent hospitalization > 6 months. 
– Patients from 8 NHs served as a reservoir 
for ESBL introduction into acute-care 
Study for Monitoring Antimicrobial Resistance 
Trends (SMART)
• Studies resistance patterns worldwide from 
2002 to 2011 
– 92,086 intra-abd infections
– 24,705 UTIs
– Significant increases in ESBL infections across 
all continents, except Africa. 
– >40% of  isolates from Asia were ESBL in 2011. 
– Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, 
Europe, and the South Pacific displayed a 
prevalence of ESBL of ~ 10%–35%. 
• US data 2012 - SENTRY
– ESBL E.coli, Klebsiella species, and Proteus 
collected from 72 hospitals across 9 US regions
• 12.2% (701/ 5739) of isolates were ESBL
• Highest region - NE 
– Overall at 23%
– 35% of KP were CRE
Morrissey I, et al. 2013; 6:1335–46. Castanheira M.  Et al. Antimicrob Agents Chemother 2014;58:833–8.
ESBL Transmission Data 
• In 100% of the > 50 studies at least 2 patients were colonized or 
infected with genotypically similar strains
– Implies patient-to-patient transmission. 
• A number of outbreaks have been described with dissemination 
of a single clone of genotypically identical ESBL 
– Clones have been found to persist for more than 3 years
French, G. L. et al.. J. Clin. Microbiol. 1998.34:358-363. Gaillot, O. et al. J. Clin. Microbiol. 1998.36:1357-1360.
Gniadkowski, M. et al. Antimicrob. Agents Chemother. 1998. 42:514-520. Neuwirth, C. et al. Antimicrob. Agents Chemother. 2001. 45:3591-3594.
ESBL Modes of Spread 
(Same as all other MDROs)
• Health-care Workers
– Hands
– Clothing, uniforms, laboratory coats, or isolation gowns 
• Can become contaminated with pathogens after care of a patient colonized/ infected with an infectious agent 
– New in the CDC isolation guidelines (HICPAC), 2007; 1-219. – cannot re-use same isolation gown even on same patient
• Common environmental sources
– Ultrasonography Coupling Gel  
– Bronchoscopes 
– Blood Pressure Cuffs
– Thermometers (Axillary)
– Cockroaches 
– Patients' Soap 
– Sink Basins 
– Babies' Baths 
IMPORTANT - Patients may have asymptomatic colonization with ESBL-producing 
organisms without signs of overt infection. 
• These patients represent an important reservoir of organisms. 
• For every patient with clinically significant ESBL infection at least one other 
patient exists in the same unit with GI colonization with an ESBL
ESBL Infection Prevention Measures
• Close attention to practices that 
may lead to breakdowns in good 
infection control 
– Audit for compliance
• Changes in antibiotic policy
– Reduce antibiotic consumption
• Ceftazidime restriction alone is 
insufficient to control continued 
infections with ESBL-
producing organisms 
• Some forced to withdraw 
cephalosporins as an entire 
class in order to reduce ESBLs. 
i. Active Surveillance 
Testing (perirectal 
swabs) to identify ESBL 
colonized 
David L. Paterson, Robert A. Bonomo. Clin. Microbiol. Rev. Oct 2005 vol. 18. Extended-Spectrum β-Lactamases: a Clinical Update
Rahal, J. J. et al. 1998. JAMA 280:1233-1237. Class restriction of cephalosporin use to control total cephalosporin resistance in nosocomial Klebsiella.
ii. Evaluation for the presence of a 
common environmental source 
iii. Campaign to improve hand 
hygiene 
iv. Contact isolation for patients 
found to be colonized or infected
The Yeahs
Veterans Affairs Initiative to Prevent 
MRSA Infections
Jain R, et al. N Engl J Med 2011;364:1419-30
• Implementation of a MRSA bundle was associated with a 
significant decline in MRSA transmission
• MRSA Bundle Components
• Nasal surveillance for MRSA
• Contact precautions for patients with MRSA
• Hand hygiene (HH) 
• Institutional culture change whereby infection control 
was everyone's responsibility
Veterans Administration (VA)
National MRSA HAI Rates Facilities
Nationwide VA Quarterly Rates of HCA MRSA Infections
27
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Methods: Stepped-wedge cluster-randomized trial
• KPC Rectal swab cultures on admission and every other week 
– Preemptive contact isolation on admits pending culture results
– Patients with a positive screen or clinical cultures were presumed to 
remain colonized and not rescreened
*Ertapenem disk, PCR for blaKPC
• Contact isolation and geographic separation of KPC + patients
– Single room or ward cohort
– Universal contact isolation of all high-acuity patients where geographic 
separation was not feasible
• Universal daily bathing
– 2% chlorhexidine-impregnated cloths
• HCW education - adherence monitoring
Results
• Compliance  - Adherence to intervention components 
was relatively high:
– Swab collection, isolation >90%
– PPE at room entry, HH at room exit, CHG bathing >70%
– HH at room entry 25% (!)
• KPC Clinical culture positivity - ↓ 32% (any source)
– KPC bacteremia ↓ 56%
• KPC Prevalence –
– Despite stable admit rate KPC prevalence ↓ from 46→34%
• (p<.001)
– Definite/possible KPC 
acquisition decreased 
by half (p=.004) during 
the intervention  period
Can you teach an old Dog a New Trick?
Guess you can teach an old dog a new trick!!
Conclusions
Control Programs that include a BUNDLED approach
• Active surveillance testing 
• HH/Contact precautions
• Environmental Cleaning 
WORK to MDROs
STAR-ICU Study
Contact Precautions: More Is Not Necessarily Better
The Nays
STAR-ICU  2011
Strategies to Reduce Transmission of Antimicrobial Resistant Bacteria in 
Intensive Care Units
Study Aim
• “Is an intensive infection control strategy better than standard infection 
control strategy at reducing MRSA/VRE incidence in adult ICUs
– Multicenter, cluster randomized trial
• Standard Control Strategy (S) N=8
– Contact Precautions for pts known to 
be MRSA/VRE colonized/infected
– Promote HH and standard 
precautions
• Intensive Control Strategy (I) N=10
– Contact precautions for pts known 
to be MRSA/VRE colonized/infected
– Promote HH and standard 
precautions




– Universal gloving until ASC results 
were available
Huskins WC et al. N Engl J Med 2011;364:1407-18
Intervention to Reduce Transmission of Resistant Bacteria in Intensive Care






Use of HH, Gloves, and Gowns by ICU HCWs
50%
50%
Would we study drug efficacy in patients who only received it half the time??
I  Units
S  Units
Results – Incidence Density of New 
Colonization or Infection Events
• NO Difference
– Results support NO effect (equal infectiveness)
Incidence Density of New 
Colonization or Infection Events
I S P-value
MRSA and VRE 40.4 35.6 0.35
MRSA 16.0 13.5 0.39
VRE 38.9 33.4 0.53
1st Question - WHAT!!!
2nd Question WHY!!!
• Too Low Too Long Too Short
• Sensitivity of Assay – Too Low
• No chromogenic media/ or PCR
• Prolonged time to ASC positivity – Too Long
• 5.2 days after culture +/- 2 days to obtain culture 
• Entered into password protected site
• Investigator had to actively get results and forward to the patient care
• > Average LOS (4.9 days) 
– 58% of patients were discharged prior to ASC results!
– Barrier Compliance – Too Low 
– Observations only done 8A - 8P
• Intervention NEVER fully implemented
• Time of intervention – 6 months Too Short
– Many studies have shown that reductions are not linear
– Reductions often not realized until > 6 months
Methodology Flaws
A 2.7-year study of AST and isolation in VA hospitals by Jain/Muder et 
al. showed significant control hospital-wide. 
The flaws of the study design prohibit assessment of Intensive Control Strategy
Contact Precautions: 
More Is Not Necessarily Better
S Dhar, et al . Infection Control And Hospital Epidemiology March 2014, Vol. 35, No. 3
How Do You Measure BETTER?
Study Features
• Objective
– To determine whether increases in contact isolation precautions are associated with 
decreased adherence to isolation practices among healthcare workers (HCWs).
• Design
– Prospective cohort study from 2/09 – 10/09 (9 Months)
• Setting
– 11 teaching hospitals
• Methods
– 1,013 observations conducted on HCWs. 
– Additional data included:
• # of persons in isolation
• Types of HCWs 
• Hospital-specific contact precaution practices
• Outcome measures - Compliance with individual components of contact isolation 
precautions during varying burdens of isolation
– Hand hygiene (HH) before and after patient encounter
– Donning of gown and gloves upon entering a patient room 
– Doffing of gown and gloves upon exiting
– Composite compliance (all 5 measures together)
Overall ≤ 20% >60% 














Total HH obs = 1,013 
Total Sites = 11 
Total Number of months = 9
Total Iso obs/month = 93
HH obs/month per facility  = 10
Iso Obs/month per facility  <1
Some Issues
And how is this helpful??
Mar-13 Apr-13 May-13 Jun-13 Jul-13 Aug-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Nov-13 Dec-13 Jan-14 Feb-14 Mar-14
ISO Days 4378 2940 4279 3911 3630 3310 4165 4594 3880 3078 4581 4170 4462
Patient Days 18914 17938 18680 18208 18883 18995 18461 19032 16960 17679 19050 17082 18445
Isolation Density 23.15% 16.39% 22.91% 21.48% 19.22% 17.43% 22.56% 24.14% 22.88% 17.41% 24.05% 24.41% 24.19%
HH compliance 99.72% 99.60% 98.83% 100.00% 93.01% 92.60% 97.70% 97.70% 99.30% 100.00% 100.00% 99.90% 99.90%
Isolation 
Compliace 99.70% 99.58% 98.48% 100.00% 93.14% 92.64% 96.99% 97.81% 99.35% 100.00% 100.00% 99.87% 99.78%
Total Isolation Days = 51,378 Total patient Days =  238,327
Conclusions/Discussion
• Placing 40% of patients under contact precautions 
represents a tipping point for noncompliance with 
contact isolation precautions measures in these hospitals. 
• Translation
– It is TOO DAMN HARD to uphold patient safety measures 
when there are more people at risk. 
REALLY!!!  
Perhaps they should spend more time and effort on 
increasing HH compliance before setting out to 
study effects of other parameters.
Sorry we are VERY Busy Today. Our Parachute Density is >60% 
I am afraid we won’t be offering you parachutes. 
Conclusions of the Paper
• Providers/IP programs should consider the negative impact of 
the burden of isolation on compliance with contact isolation 
precautions when developing infection control policies/practices. 
– We do BUT still expect compliance to be near perfect
• Indiscriminately placing patients in contact precautions might 
have the adverse effect of decreasing the efficacy of contact 
isolation precautions in controlling the spread of MDROs.
– Define Indiscriminately? 
– Efficacy is not decreased in hospitals that practice consistent 
infection prevenion
• Burden of isolation of 40% may represent a tipping point, above 
which compliance with contact isolation precautions drops 
significantly.
YIKES!! 
Hard to imagine isolation density of 40% but if 
isolation practices are hard wired density should 
not result is decreased compliance.
The Infamous Stelfox Study 
Safety of Patients Isolated for Infection Control
• Nonrandomized study
• “Adverse events” were higher in patients on CP than those not on CP
– Absolute terms and adjusted for length of stay.
• A rate of 31 versus 15 adverse events/1000 days was observed in isolated 
vs nonisolated patients (P < .001). 
• General process of care measures were worse in CP patients. 
– Inappropriate documentation of vital signs (14% vs 9%, respectively, P < .001) 
– Days without a physician note (26% vs 13%, respectively, P < .001)
– Days without a nursing note (14% vs 10%, respectively, P < .001)
• CHF specific process measures were worse in CP patients. 
– Stress testing (14% vs 45%, P < .001) 
– Evaluation of left ventricular function (57% vs 69%, P =.049), 
Stelfox HT, Bates DW, Redelmeier DA. JAMA 2003; 290:1899‐1905
THE STUDY FOUND NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN MORTALITY
DIAGNOSTIC, OPERATIVE, ANESTHETIC, MEDICAL PROCEDURE, 
OR ADVERSE DRUG EVENTS. 
Bottom Line
• If neglect of isolated patients is associated with 
adverse effects
– Facilities should spend time correcting bad behavior 
instead of measuring outcomes of this tolerance
• Inexcusable behavior by medical professionals 
should not be used as justification for avoiding 
use of effective control measures and allowing, 
no promoting, transmission of lethal infections.
What Are Others Doing?
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Acinetobacter baumanii (ACAT) MDR by Unique Patient at PUH
Jan 2009 to May 2015
Source: Antibiotic Management Program - Clinical Analyst
MRSA Whole House HAI Rates
SUSTAINED REDUCTION
84% reduction
University of Pittsburgh Summary
Annual Estimated Benefits of MRSA Control (02-10)
Avoided MRSA HAI… 87
Lives Saved… 21
Avoided Costs… $3.1M
Sending Patients Home Alive and Well…Priceless!!
Conclusions
(1) Do MDRO Control Measures work? YES without question 
(when done correctly)
(2) Are Contact precautions necessary to for 
MDRO control? 
YES
(3) Are patients in contact precautions as safe 
as other patients? 
YES 
(when not neglected)
(4) Can we use conclusions of studies without 
analysis of methods?
OF COURSE NOT
MRDO Prevention
Questions?
